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14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21 
18 
41, 42 
appellate affirming the 
magistrate's summary judgment in favor of the City of Blackfoot, determining its assessment 
2 EDU multipliers on the Ma.r1waring Professional Building v;as reasonable. 
This appeal followed the district court's affirmance of the magistrate's denial of 
Manwaring Investments, L.C.'s, motion for summary judgment, grant of the City's summary 
judgment, ent::-y of amended judgment and denial of Manwaring Investments, L.C.'s, Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
Course of the Proceedings 
Manwaring Investments, L.C., (MILC) on October 15, 2014 filed a Complaint against 
the City of Blackfoot alleging the City's method of assessing equivalent dwelling unit factors 
on a commercial office building violated state statutes, was arbitrary and unreasonable, 
constituted an unlawful tax, violated due process and resulted in damages for overcharges. 
(Clerk's Record, pp. 8-17). 
On November 4, 2014, the City filed its Answer to MILC's Complaint. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 18-23). 
On March 11, 2015 MILC filed a motion for preliminary injunction supported by the 
Affidavit of Gregg Manwaring and Affidavit of Counsel. (Clerk's Record, p. 2). 
On March 18, 2015, the City filed an objection to MILC's motion for preliminary 
injunction. (Clerk's Record, p. 2). 
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Rex Moffat, Affidavit 
(Clerk's Record, p. 2). 
Suzanne support. 
On March 25, 2015, a hearing was held on MILC's motion for preliminary irJunction, 
and through ruling in open court the magistrate denied that motion. (Clerk's Record, p. 3). 
MILC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 2015. (Clerk's Record, p. 
3). MILC's motion was supported by the Affidavit of Gregg Manwaring, Affidavit of Lance 
Bates, Affidavit of Counsel, and a memorandum in support. (Clerk's Record, p. 3; pp. 24-
121 ). 
On May 1, 2015, the City filed its Brief in Response to MILC's motion for summary 
judgment together with the Affidavit of Rex Moffat. (Clerk's Record, p. 3). 
Also on May 1, 2015 the City filed an objection to the Affidavit of Lance Bates. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 3). 
On May 4, 2015 MILC filed its Brief in Opposition to the City's motion for summary 
judgment. (Clerk's Record, p. 3). 
On May 11, 2015 MILC filed its Response in Opposition to the City's Objection to 
the Affidavit of Lance Bates. (Clerk's Record, p. 3). 
On May 11, 2015 MILC filed its Reply Brief on its motion for summary judgment. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 3). 
On May 11, 2015 the City filed its Reply Brief on its motion for summary judgment. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 4). 
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18, 15. 
Judgment, pp. 1-50). 
denied MILC's motion for summary judgment and granted the City's motion for summary 
judgment. (Clerk's Record, pp. 124-127). 
A document titled Judgment prepared by counsel for the City was entered May 21, 
2015. (Clerk's Record, pp. 128-129). 
The City on June 3, 2015 filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees together with an affidavit 
in support. (Clerk's Record, p. 4). 
On June 5, 2015 MILC filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order entered May 
20, 2015. (Clerk's Record, p. 4). 
On June 12, 2015 MILC filed its Objection to the City's motion for fees and a Motion 
to Disallow all Requested Fees. (Clerk's Record, p. 4). 
On June 17, 2015 the City filed its Objection to MILC's motion for reconsideration. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 4). 
On June 25, 2015 MILC filed its Reply to the City's objection to the motion for 
reconsideration. (Clerk's Record, p. 4). 
On June 30, 2015 MILC filed its Notice of Appeal. (Clerk's Reco,·d, pp. 130-131). 
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on for ·s of 
Hearing, Afotion for Summary Judgment, pp. 51-78). 
On July 15, 2015 the magistrate entered its Order P..E: tviotion for Attorney~ Fees and 
Motion to Reconsider denying MILC's motion for reconsideration and denying the City's 
motion for fees. (Clerk's Record, pp. 132-134). 
On July 20, 2015 MILC filed its Amended Notice of Appeal. (Clerk's Record, pp. 
135-136). 
On August 3, 2015 the City filed its Notice of Cross Appeal. (Clerk's Record, pp. 
138-139). 
On August 7, 2015 the district court filed its Notice of Intent to Dismiss Appeal 
noting that the judgment entered May 21, 2015 did not conform to requirements of I.R.C.P. 
54(a) and granted 20 days for entry of a conforming final judgment. (Clerk's Record, p. 5). 
Judgment in favor of the City in dismissing MILC's complaint, denying MILC's 
motion for reconsideration, and denying the City's motion for fees was entered August 25, 
2015. (Clerk's Record, p. 140). 
MILC filed its Second Amended Notice of Appeal on August 28, 2015. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 142-143). 
On September 17, 2015 the district court filed its Second Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Appeal. (Clerk's Record, p. 6). 
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On October 5, 2015 MILC filed its Third Amended Notice of Appeal. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 6). 
On April 21, 2016 oral argument on appeal was presented to the district court. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 6). 
On June 22, 2016, the district court filed its Decision and Order on Appeal affirming 
the magistrate's grant of summary judgment to the City and the denial of MILC's summary 
judgment. (Clerk's Record, p. 6; pp. 156-193). 
The district court upheld the magistrate's decision on an alternate theory; 
consequently, the district court remanded the case t0 the magistrate for consideration of 
attorney fees under the alternate theory. (Clerk's Record, p. 192). 
On July 6, 2016 the City filed in the district court a motion for attorney fees 
supported by an affidavit. (Clerk's Record, p. 6). 
On July 18, 2016 MILC filed its objection to the City's motion for fees, filed a 
motion to disallow fees, and a motion for sanctions. (Clerk's Record, p. 6). 
On August 1, 2016 MILC filed its notice of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 194-242). 
Hearing on the City's motion for fees and MILC's objection and motion for sanctions 
was held August I, 2016. (Clerk's Record, p. 6). 
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attorney fees on CI.UL/vUl 
Record, p. 7). 
Statement of the Facts 
motion (Clerk's 
The following undisputed facts were before the magistrate on the cross motions for 
summary judgment. 
Manwaring Professional Building 
Manwaring Investments, L.C., owns the Manwaring Professional Building located at 
490 N. Maple, Blackfoot, Idaho. (Clerk's Record, p. 46). The Building is comprised of 10 
individual offices; 8 of those offices being 15x 15 feet and two of the offices being 1 Ox 15 feet 
for a total of 2100 square feet of office space. (Clerk's Record, pp. 46-4 7). 
There are 6 plumbing fixtures in the Building: 2 toilets and 4 sinks. (Clerk's Record, 
p. 47). There are no other plumbing fixtures. (Clerk's Record, p. 47). The daily occupancy 
for the Building from the years 2009 through 2015 ranged from 8 to 10 people. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 486). At no time from 2007 through May 2014 did the Building have more than 
20 employees occupying it on a daily basis. (Clerk's Record, p. 48). 
Water consumption at the Building was metered by the City of Blackfoot. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 47-48; Clerk's Record, p. 79). The indoor water consumption at the Building for 
the years 2007 through 2015 ranged from a low of 52.9 gallons per day (gpd) to a high of 
98.89 gpd. (Clerk's Record, pp. 47-48). 
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users consummg water 
amounting to 5,187,350 gallons annually or 217.31 average gpd. (Clerk's Record, p. 90). 
~A ... dditionall:y, City records established 2,072 residential tenants consuming lvater amounting 
to 709,785 gallons annually or 342.56 average gpd. (Clerk's Record, p. 90). The combined 
average of all residential water users in the City is 279.94 gpd. (Clerk's Record, p. 48). 
City ordinance 9-3-20 established sewer rates for commercial office buildings based 
on estimated Equivalent Dwelling Units defined as "The average volume of domestic water 
discharged from an average residential dwelling unit." Blackfoot City Code 9-3-2. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 74-76). An EDU multiplier factor was used to assess sewer rates. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 74-76). 
In establishing its ordinance, the City did not rely upon a quantifiable basis for the 
designations of EDU multiplier factors applicable to commercial sources. (Clerk's Record, 
pp 7 4-77). Through Resolution No. 240, the City defined "One equivalent user... as 
contributing 350 gallons per day [gpd] of wastewater .... The equivalent user flow has been 
developed from population and sewer usage records." (Clerk's Record, pp. 75-77). 
Additionally, the City recognized the national EPA standard for sewage discharge purposes 
as establishing a base of 350 gpd per EDU of wastewater discharge. (Clerk's Record, pp. 76-
77). The express purpose of Resolution No. 240 was to distribute costs to each sewer user in 
approximate portion to a user's contribution to the total wastewater load .... " (Clerk's Record, 
pp. 75-77). 
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applicable to Building was an to 20 Record, 
pp. 74-75). The term office was not defined. (Clerk's Record, pp. 74-75). 
i\.ccording to }~1offat, his understanding of the \Vord office as used in the ordinance 
would allow the City to apply a multiplier of 1 EDU for each separate tenant leasing space in 
the Building. (Clerk's Record, pp. 81-84). Moffat claimed the City could assess 10 EDUs to 
the Building for each of the 10 office spaces. (Clerk's Record, pp. 81-84; p. 112). 
Based upon the above facts the City's sewer rate structure for a commercial 
office building for the years 2007 through May 2014 was: 
Up to 20 employees: a multiplier of 1 EDU. 
From 2007 through May 2014 the City assessed MILC a multiplier of 2 ED Us. 
The Building never exceeded 20 employees or occupants. 
MILC was charged double for sewer services from 2007-2014. 
City's Rate Structure May 2014 to Present 
The underlying EDU quantifying basis for wastewater discharge as explained in the 
preceding section did not change with the City's new ordinance 9-2-20 adopted in May 2014. 
Under the new ordinance, the designation for EDUs applied to office buildings was 
changed from number of employees to a square footage basis. (Clerk's Record, pp. 81-84). 
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's Record, pp. 81-84). 
definition for the word office in the new ordinance. (Clerk's Record, pp. 81-84). 
was no 
There \Vas no explar1ation in the ordina11ce of vvhcthcr the square footage used for 
determining EDU multipliers was an office building's gross square footage or actual 
occupied square footage. (Clerk's Record, pp. 81-84). 
The nature of use, number of persons occupying the office, amount of water 
consumed, or similar engineering standards were not relied upon in making the designation 
of square footage as the basis for applying the multipliers for EDU s. (Clerk's Record, pp. 81-
84). 
As part of creating the 2014 ordinance 9-3-20, the City examined sewer rate charts 
and ordinances from other municipalities. (Clerk's Record, p. 74; pp. 93-94). Ordinances 
from other municipalities relied upon objective, recognized engineering standards for their 
respective EDUs, including number of employees, gross square footage times a factor based 
on quantified EDUs, and plumbing fixtures. (Clerk's Record, p. 74; pp. 93-94). 
Based upon the above facts the City's sewer rate structure for a commercial 
office building for the time period May 2014 to the present was: 
For each 4,000 square feet of space: a multiplier of 1 EDU. 
From May 2014 to the present the City assessed MILC a multiplier of 2 ED Us. 
MILC was charged double for sewer services provided from 2014 to the present. 
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accepted m treatise, 
Wastewater Engineering, Metcalf & Eddy, 3rd Editions, provide objective, quantifiable 
bases for determining EDU multipliers for sevvage discharge rates from commercial office 
buildings. (Clerk's Record, pp. 38-44). Those standards are based on well-recognized factors 
such as nature and type of commercial use, number of employees, plumbing fixtures, and 
known water consumption. (Clerk's Record, pp. 38-44). 
Lance Bates was the only engineer presenting evidence for purposes of summary 
judgment. In the opinion of Lance Bates, Blackfoot's current ordinance 9-3-20 using square 
footage as the sole factor for designating EDU multipliers for commercial office buildings is 
arbitrary. (Clerk's Record, pp. 38-45). In the opinion of Lance Bates, the Building can only 
be given a multiplier of 1 EDU. (Clerk's Record, pp. 38-45). Any greater multiplier would 
result in the Building being assessed sewer fees unrelated in any manner to actual sewage 
flowrates. (Clerk's Record, pp. 3 8-45). 
Known water consumption is a factor considered with other factors in determining 
wastewater flowrate from an office building. (Clerk's Record, pp. 38-44; p. 80; pp. 86-87). 
Sewage discharge flowrates are 70-85% of the amount of water consumed. (Clerk's Record, 
pp. 38-44; pp. 86-87). 
The amount of wastewater discharged at the Building can be reasonably calculated 
for purposes of determining an EDU multiplier. (Clerk's Record, pp. 38-44). Based upon 
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sewage discharge. 's pp. pp. 
Established water consumption of 100 gpd or less at the Building cannot generate 
sewage discharge flowrates from the Building exceeding 100 gpd. (Clerk's Record, pp. 3 8-
44; pp. 47-48; p. 80; p. 86). Water consumed at the Building is less in gpd than the 
equivalent amount of water consumed in residential dwellings within the City. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 4 7-68; p. 104 ). The Building has a sewage discharge flowrate amounting to less 
than 1/3 of the City's accepted standard equivalent user flowrate of 350 gpd. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 38-44; pp. 47-48). 
Although Rex Moffat testified it may be possible to introduce liquids beyond water 
consumed into the sewage discharge from the Building through tenants or others bringing in 
large quantities of liquids or discharging sewage through the Building's cleanout, he 
acknowledged there was no evidence supporting his hypothesis. (Clerk's Record, pp. 79-80). 
Other Pertinent Facts 
In 2007 the City in some manner performed an assessment of the Building's sewer 
account. (Clerk's Record, p. 108). The City did not submit notice of its assessment to MILC. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 81; p. 108). Instead, the City without notice to MILC increased the 
monthly sewer fees in 2008. (Clerk's Record, p. 108). 
The City did not give notice to MILC that beginning in 2008 the City began applying 
a multiplier of 2 EDUs to the Building. (Clerk's Record, pp. 80-81). The City did not in any 
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to Building. (Clerk's Record, pp. 80-8 ; 49). 
On August 13, 2014 the City performed an assessment on the Building for purposes 
of determining classification of EDUs under the ne,v ordinance. (Clerk's Record, p. 113; 
Augmented Record). The City did not give notice of that assessment to MILC. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 49) 
The City agreed that Idaho law required its sewer rates to have a reasonable basis in 
relation to the services being offered. (Clerk's Record, p. 78). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the magistrate err as a matter of law in determining the City did not violate LC. § 
50-1028? 
Did the magistrate err as a matter of law in determining the City was not 
unreasonable or arbitrary in its application of EDU multipliers to the Building? 
Did the magistrate err as a matter of law in determining that the City's sewer rates 
applied to the Builder were not an unlawful tax where MILC is paying for services it is not 
receiving? 
Did the magistrate err as a matter of law in determining that the City did not violate 
MILC' s due process rights when the City failed to give notice of the increase in EDU 
multipliers it was assessing to the Building? 
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sewer to 
Did the magistrate abuse its discretion in failing to issue an injunction preventing the 
Citv from ovf'r~h:-m:i-ino- MTT C for <::f'Wf'r rntf'<:: for thf' R11ilrlino-? - --.,, -- ---- - . -- ------0---0 - - --- - -- - - - . ' -- ------ --- ---- - ---------o. 
Did the magistrate abuse its discretion in denying MILC's motion for 
reconsideration? 
Is MILC entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorney foes on appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review on Appeal 
When the district court acts in its appellate capacity, the decision of the district court 
is directly reviewed on appeal for error rather than reviewing the magistrate court's decision 
independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's decision. In re the 
Hospitalization of Daniel W, 145 Idaho 677, 679, 183 P.3d 765, 767 (2008). Therefore, on 
appeal, the standard is whether the district court committed error with respect to the issues 
presented. In re Doe, 148 Idaho 124,219 P.3d 448 (2009). 
Review of the district court's decision acting in its appellate capacity on appeal from 
summary judgment is further subject to the standard of whether the district court correctly 
applied the same standard of review that the magistrate court used in ruling on the motions 
for summary judgment. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000). 
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material and movmg 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
court exercises free review and is not bound by findings of the trial court but is free to draw 
its own conclusions from the evidence presented. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'! Ass'n, 141 
Idaho 362, 366, 109 P.3d 1104, 1108 (2005). Thus, there is an independent review of the 
trial court's resolution of "whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the 
prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 
Idaho 337, 338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 (2007). "If uncontroverted facts exist which lead to a 
definite disposition as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate." G & lvf Farms v. 
Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851, 861 (1991). See also Callies v. 
O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,846,216 P.3d 130, 135 (2009). 
A The district court erred as a matter of law when it sua sponte applied an alternative 
theory that MILC failed to comply with LC. § 50-219. 
Neither the City nor the magistrate raised or considered LC. § 50-219. The City did 
not assert any defense based on § 50-219 and, contrary to the district court's decision, the 
City did not raise the issue either factually or legally on summary judgment. There was no 
basis for the district court to resort to the alternative theory of LC. § 50-219. 
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court magistrate correct judgment on an 
incorrect basis. Reaching beyond the pleadings, motions, and arguments of the parties, the 
district court latched upon the alternative theory of LC. § 50-219 citing Syringa Networks, 
LLC v. Idaho Department of Administration, 367 P.3d 208 (2016). 
The genesis for the alternative theory rule announced in Syringa are found in Gagnon 
v. St. Afaries Light & Power Co., Ltd., 26 Idaho 87, 91, 141 P. 88, 90 (1914) and Jorgenson 
v. Stirling, 35 Idaho 785,791,209 P. 271,273 (1922). 
The principal purpose of appellate courts is to review the conclusions of law 
of the trial court and correct such as are deemed to be erroneous, and where 
the final judgment of the trial court is correct, when entered upon an erroneous 
theory of law, the judgment will be affirmed by the appellate court upon what 
it conceives to be the correct theory of the law. 
Jorgensen, 35 Idaho at 791. 
Since those decisions there has been a plethora of appellate decisions. Research of 
those decisions reveals, however, that the alternative theory rule does not extend judicial 
reach to any possible ethereal theory. Rather, the rule is applied to theories of law evident 
from the actual pleadings and theories advanced by the parties, whether advanced in the trial 
court or on appeal. City of Weippe for Use and Benefit of Les Schwab Tire Centers of Idaho, 
Inc. v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 528 P.2d 201 (1974); Robison v. Compton, 97 Idaho 615,617, 
549 P.2d 274, 276 (1976); Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 595 
P.2d 709 (l 979)("We therefore review the theories advanced by seller in order to determine 
if they provide a basis for upholding the trial court's granting of partial summary judgment"); 
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459, 680 . I and credit 
argument); Daleiden v. Jefferson County Joint School Dist No. 251, 139 Idaho 466, 80 P.3d 
1067 (2003)(school district's argument that it had no duty was persuasive and provided 
alternative theory); Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 397, 224 P.3d 
458, 464 (2008)(new theory advanced by respondent on appeal); Grabicki v. City of 
Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686,692, 302 P.3d 26, 32 (2013)(considered all exceptions on immunity 
from liability). 
The district court on appeal cannot uphold the magistrate's judgment on a theory 
nonexistent in the pleadings and motions, previously unexamined, not advanced by any 
party, and for which the factual and legal bases were never addressed by the parties or trial 
court. The district court erred in applying the alternative theory ofl.C. § 50-219. 
Sua Sponte Issues 
Firmly established m Idaho is the rule that in deciding a motion for summary 
judgment the trial court cannot examine issues not raised in the motion. Thomson v. Idaho 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1994). Subsequent to the decision in 
Thomson, the Idaho Supreme Court in reliance on that case unmistakably stated, "The district 
court may not grant summary judgment on a ground raised sua sponte." Sales v. Peabody, 
157 Idaho 195,201, 335 P.3d 40, 46 (2014). 
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550, 14), where the Idaho Supreme Court the following 
policy for the rule. 
Theories and defenses should be determined by the parties, not the tribunal. 
Just as in Sales, where we held it was error for the district court to raise an 
affirmative defense not raised by the parties, the Commission erred here in 
raising collateral estoppel, which was never raised by Employer/Surety before 
the Commission invited briefing on the issue. Although Employer/Surety may 
not have known the complete substance of the ISIF agreement, there is no 
question it knew ISIF had settled with Deon and therefore knew ISIF had 
accepted some level of liability to Deon. Despite this knowledge, either 
intentionally or by oversight, Employer/Surety chose not to raise estoppel 
theories as a defense to Deon's claim. In Heitz, we held that a party is bound 
by the theory upon which it tries its case. We cannot speak to the reasons 
Employer/Surety failed to assert estoppel, but just as in Sales and Heitz, 
Employer/Surety is held to that choice. The Commission cannot raise the 
defense of collateral estoppel for Employer/Surety even if it felt 
Employer/Surety would have prevailed had it chosen to raise the issue. Our 
system works best when the parties devise their own litigation strategies. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
The City chose not to defend MILC's claim on the basis of§ 50-219. Waiver of that 
defense may have been intentional or by oversight; nonetheless, it was never raised in the 
City's pleadings or in its motion for summary judgment. Notably, the City defended on the 
basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, not § 50-219. 
Although the district court was acting as an appellate court and not the trial court for 
purposes of summary judgment, by parity of reasoning based on the above authorities, when 
the district court sua sponte raised § 50-219, it acted super judicially and removed from the 
parties all ability to present facts and argument concerning application of that statute. The 
district court erred. 
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Assuming arguendo that a sua sponte the 
district court on appeal is an allowable tangent of the rule for upholding judgments on an 
There are two compounding additional errors: first, the district court's manifest 
reliance on the City's response to MILC's summary judgment; and second, the district 
court's manufactured facts on the essential issue of notice of EDU assessment increases. 
The district court cited the City's response to MILC's motion for summary judgment. 
In that response, the City alleged without any supporting facts that MILC received a monthly 
invoice and MILC took no action on each monthly invoice; thus, MILC failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies. The district court then determined without any factual basis, 
"Implied within the City's argument is Manwaring's failure to timely notify the City of its 
claim that its building should not be assessed a sewer rate of two (2) EDU s under the former 
City ordinances." It appears the district court considered the City's theory of failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies was sufficient to invoke sua sponte on appeal the application 
ofI.C. § 50-219. The district court erred. 
The district court went on to observe that the magistrate "did not address the notice 
requirement of Idaho Code § 50-219 and § 6-906. Instead, Judge Hansen addressed the 
question of Manwaring's exhaustion of administrative remedies .... " The magistrate did not 
address § 50-219 because it was never raised as an issue. 
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court copies of records for 2014 and 3 
months of 2015. The court acknowledged "nothing on the billing statements shows the 
nnmher of FDT Tc: ::isc:e.c:c:ecl ::ig::iinc:t the Rnilcling for p11rpoc:ec: of the -:ewer ch::irge .. " R::ic:ecl 
upon those billing statements the district court made the factual leap of stating, "it is readily 
apparent that when the City first increased the Buildings EDU assessment from a 1 to a 2, 
which occurred in 2007 or 2008, the charge next to the word 'SEWER' would have doubled 
from that of the previous month." 
No facts support the district court's theory of making an inference from 2014 and 
2015 invoices to establish facts from 2007 to 2014, particularly while acknowledging such 
billing records gave no notice of EDU assessments. The district court erred. 
The uncontradicted evidence from the Affidavit of Gregg Manwaring was that MILC 
had no notice that the City increased the EDU assessments against the building from 1 to 2. 
Nothing in the billing records can be construed as notice of increased fees due to added EDU 
assessments. 
Additionally, the district court noted the City's written assessment sheet used in 2014 
to establish EDU assessments but failed to recognize the due process import of the City's 
established procedure for giving notice of EDU assessments. The City's assessment sheet 
was expressly for the purpose of giving a property owner notice of any change in EDU 
assessments. Unrefuted facts established the City used its written assessment sheet to 
evaluate the building's EDU assessment; yet, the City admittedly did not give notice of the 
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timely to challenge assessment. Consequent! y, 
MILC did not have notice of the increase in its sewer fees based on a change in EDU 
assessments. 
When, as here, the City established a notice procedure relating to EDU assessments 
affecting an owner's property interests, the City's failure to follow its own notice procedure 
was a violation of MILC's due process. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558, 94 
S.Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974); State v. Egdorf, 77 P.3d 517, 521-22 (Mont. 2003). 
"Despite its malleable characteristics, a fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Simmons v. 
Board o.[Trustees of Independent School Dist. No. I, 102 Idaho 552,554,633 P.2d 1130, 
1132 (1980) citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 
62 (1965). 
"What the Fourteenth Amendment does reqmre, however, is 'an opportunity ... 
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,' 'for [a] hearing appropriate to the 
nature of the case."' Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1159 
(1982). Due process requires notice of government action and opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful manner. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-386, 28 S.Ct. 708, 714 (1908); 
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company v. Berg, 52 Idaho 499, 16 P.2d 373, 374 (1932)(LID 
tax bond without specific notice to affected owners violated due process). 
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through assessment multipliers City's 
ordinance, such process must be used to give property owners the right to examine the 
the City's failure to follow its own notice procedure is a denial of the property owner's right 
to due process. Otherwise, property owners like MILC never receive actual notice of the 
reasons for the sewer fee increase and lose the opportunity for meaningful and timely 
challenge to the increase. 
Because the City used its procedure in completing the wTitten evaluation on MILC's 
building to establish EDU assessments but admittedly failed to give that notice to MILC, the 
City prevented MILC from obtaining timely notice of EDU assessments that would have 
allowed MILC the opportunity for meaningful hearing. The City's violation of MILC's due 
process cannot constitute grounds upon which the district court bases its alternative theory of 
finding MILC did not comply with the notice requirements of LC. § 50-219. 
B. The district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the City did not violate 
LC.§ 50-1028. 
Argument 
Idaho Code § 50-1028 is part of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. That Act grants 
municipalities authority to charge sewer fees as part of a city's proprietary function. Loomis 
v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P .2d 1272 (1991 ). However, sewer fees must bear some 
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5 Idaho 768 765 (1989). 
In pertinent part the statute states the City "shall manage such works in the most 
efficient manner consistent with sound economy and public advantage, to the end that the 
services of such works shall be furnished at the lowest possible cost" LC. § 50-1028. 
Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48,256 P.2d 515 (1953). 
Lost in the district court's, and the magistrate's, analyses was the overarching 
requirement that sewer fees charged must bear some reasonable relationship to the costs of 
services provided. If sewer fees do not have a reasonable relationship to the cost of actual 
services provided, then the City has violated the Act. 
Relying upon a snippet from Kootenai County Property Ass'n v. Kootenai County, 
115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989), the lower courts reasoned that reasonable 
approximation is all that is necessary. Kootenai does not stand for the proposition that any 
approximation is reasonable. Instead, the reasonable relationship standard is examined with 
regard to the underlying facts. 
Important to its determination on the reasonableness of the solid waste fees in 
Kootenai County was the Supreme Court's observation, "The association presents no 
evidence showing that a $54 charge is not reasonably related to the annual benefit which the 
dwellings derive from the solid waste system." (Emphasis added.) 
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on the "'"'"-"''F, was and is not reasonably related to the actual benefit MILC 
receives from the City's wastewater system. 
Undisputed facts establish the following points pertinent to the issue of reasonable 
relationship of sewer fees to actual service provided: 
Y The City's former and current ordinances are based on Equivalent Dwelling 
Units tied to a standard of 350 gpd of wastewater flowrates. 
Y The Building has a proven wastewater flowrate of less than 100 gpd. 
Y The Building has never had more than 20 employees. 
> Engineering standards used in estimating wastewater flowrates for purposes of 
establishing EDU multipliers for commercial office buildings are established 
at 0.04 per employee or up to 25 employees in an office building. 
Y The Building discharges wastewater in a flowrate amount less than the City's 
EDU base flowrate. 
> MILC receives the benefit of up to 1 EDU in sewer services and yet pays 
twice that amount in sewer rates. 
Under the above facts, the City's sewer charge to MILC based on an assessment of 2 
EDUs to the Building bears no reasonable relationship to the actual sewer service MILC 
receives. Instead, the City is charging MILC double the amount for the actual sewer services 
provided. 
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that the City's assessment 2 
the actual benefit received. 
related to 
The district court correctly noted ~v1ILC's position that ''the City's charge of 2 EDU 
multipliers to the Building was a charge of double rates not reasonably related to the benefit 
conferred." (Memorandum Decision, p. 25). Then the district court takes an odd divergence. 
Instead of examining whether the City's 2 EDU assessments against the Building had 
a reasonable relationship to the actual sewer services provided to MILC, the district court 
entered into an analysis of whether the City's ordinance was reasonable. The district court's 
analysis was incorrect. 
Of course, the district court did not examine MILC's challenge to the former City 
ordinance and its EDU assessment scheme. Unquestionably, the City was in violation of the 
former ordinance when it assessed 2 EDUs to the Building based not on numbers of 
employees as required by its ordinance, but solely based on the City's claim that it could 
assess more than one EDU where the Building had two equal halves. 
Challenging the 2014 ordinance, MILC contended the ordinance based on square 
footage alone was not in compliance with national engineering standards and was random. 
Additionally, MILC contested the City's assessment of 2 EDUs to the Building because the 
City's ordinance addressed only square footage of office space. The ordinance does not 
otherwise define how office space is measured. The City argued the Building exceeded 
4,000 square feet but, notably, the City did not claim the Building had over 4,000 square feet 
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space Building was less than 4,000 square 
feet 
further determined that Lance Bates' Affidavit was not material to the issue of square footage 
because the court considered MILC's challenge limited to the application of the 2014 
ordinance to the Building. The district court erred in both regards. 
Bates' affidavit is material and the lower courts ignored the uncontroverted evidence 
of national engineering standards applicable to determining reasonableness of EDU 
assessments on commercial office buildings. Under applicable standards, an ordinance based 
solely on square footage is arbitrary and random - a fact overlooked by the district court. 
The national standard for determining EDU assessments is 1 EDU for up to 25 employees. 
Idaho follows the thoroughly entrenched Pierstoff Rule: A court must accept as true 
the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his or her testimony is 
inherently improbable. Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447-48, 74 P.2d 171, 
175 (1937). Particularly, a court cannot disregard uncontradicted expert testimony and 
substitute its own theory or methodology. See Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical 
Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709,715,330 P.3d 1067 (2014). 
Lance Bates was the only civil engineer presenting evidence to the court. His 
testimony was not simply restricted to engineering processes that worked for the City of 
Ammon. Rather, he testified to the actual engineering standards nationally accepted and part 
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as immaterial, mere 
opinion instead of substantiated engineering methodology and theory, constitutes error as a 
Bates testified the City's 2014 ordinance usmg an EDU multiplier system based 
solely on square footage was arbitrary and random. That testimony was uncontradicted. 
Further, Bates testified that the Building should be assessed only the minimum 1 EDU under 
the City's rate schedule. It is essential to note the City utterly failed to produce any evidence 
that showed square footage alone, or shared facilities, was based on any reasonable factual 
support, engineering studies, or national standards. 
The district court erred as a matter of law in disregarding Bates' testimony and expert 
opm10n. 
The legal standard is one of reasonableness of the fees in light of the statutory 
restriction that fees be reasonably related to the benefit of the actual service provided at the 
lowest possible cost. Not only must a standard of reasonableness be met, but also the EDU 
assessments making the basis for sewer fees cannot be imposed arbitrarily. 
As applied to the above standards, undisputed facts show the City's assessment of 2 
EDUs under either its former ordinance or under the 2014 ordinance resulted in charges for 
sewer services not reasonably related to actual benefit. Moreover, the City's imposition of 2 
EDUs to the Building was arbitrary under both the prior and current ordinances. 
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s ordinance to Building. Most glaring is the district court's 
observation, "Mr. Moffat carefully explained, however, that the amount of metered water 
pipe." (Memorandum Decision, p. 27). Moffat's testimony was totally refuted where he 
admitted that the Building cannot discharge more effluent than the amount of water used in 
the Building. Although Moffat suggested someone could surreptitiously add effluent through 
the Building's outside sewer clean-out, he conceded there were no facts supporting his 
hypothesis. In sum, Moffat's testimony didn't hold water. 
The district court continued its analysis with a review of Moffat's testimony about 
how the City looked at other jurisdictions to come up with its ordinance. That very process 
manifests how arbitrary and random the City's ordinance is: nothing was based on factual 
data regarding actual EDU determinations in the City; rather, there was mere reliance on 
another city's ordinance without any investigation into the underlying criteria. Where the 
City failed to obtain facts to support its 2014 ordinance, it relied upon no objective standard, 
rendering wholly arbitrary its decision to settle on square footage for EDU assessment 
purposes. 
As if to buttress its explanations, the district court then notes the Kootenai case for the 
notion that "a flat fee rate imposed by municipalities, instead of a rate which reflected actual 
use, is reasonable, even when actual use monitoring is possible." (lvfemorandum Decision, p. 
29). 
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presents no evidence a $54 charge is not reasonably related to the 
annual benefit which the dwellings derive from the solid waste system." (Emphasis added.) 
Building is not reasonably related to the actual benefit received from the City's sewer 
services. 
The standard is whether the City's assessment of 2 EDUs was reasonably related to 
the actual benefit of sewer services to the Building. Upon that simple standard, MILC has 
proven with undisputed evidence that the City's sewer fee based on its assessment of 2 ED Us 
bears no reasonable relationship to the actual sewer services to the Building. 
The district court erred in ruling otherwise. 
C. The district court erred as a matter of law in determining the City was not 
unreasonable or arbitrary in its application of EDU multipliers to the Building. 
When a city ordinance in its wording or application is unreasonable, arbitrary, 
capricious or discriminatory, it is unconstitutional and may be set aside. State v. Bowman, 
104 Idaho 39, 655 P.2d 933 (1982). The challenging party bears the burden of proving the 
ordinance or its application is arbitrary. Id. 
The district court did not expressly decide this issue although it concluded the City's 
2014 ordinance was reasonable because it was based on similar ordinances from other 
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Neither position is factually nor legally 
No facts support the court's determination that under either the City's former or 
EDUs. Under the City's former ordinance in effect from 2007 to May 2014, the EDU 
multiplier was based on number of employees. Under the City's 2014 ordinance, square 
footage was the sole determinate factor. Moreover, the Black and Veatch study noted by the 
district court had absolutely nothing to do with establishing an EDU standard or how to apply 
EDU assessments. 
According to Moffat's testimony, neither the City's former or current ordinance had a 
quantified factual basis for EDU flowrates. Without such a factual basis, the ordinances are 
per se unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. 
However, the City in Resolution 240 adopted a standard EDU flowrate of 350 gpd. 
Using the City's adopted standard, its application of 2 EDU multipliers to the Building under 
either ordinance was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. 
It is beyond cavil that the City's position espoused in Moffat's testimony that it could 
apply 1 EDU for every separate office within the Building was and is totally subjective, 
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. No rational basis in fact or law sustains Moffat's 
claim that the City could assess 10 EDU multipliers to the Building. That position is absurd. 
Moffat's opinion is grossly inconsistent with the City's ordinances and the facts. 
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it it a right to so 
do. In like manner, the City's application of 2 EDUs to the Building 1s subjective, 
Known engineering standards and methods were available to but not used by the City 
in establishing its EDU multipliers. Those standards incorporate factors such as the nature 
and type of use of a commercial office building, actual or estimated consumption of water 
within the building, the number of persons occupying the building, and the number and type 
of restroom facilities and other plumbing fixtures utilized in the building. 
The district court improperly disregarded applicable engineering standards presented 
through the only engineer who gave testimony. Bates testified to the national engineering 
standards and the application of those standards to the City's ordinance and the Building. 
Bates further testified that the City's current ordinance based solely on square footage was 
arbitrary. Bates' unrefuted testimony established the City's assessment of 2 EDU multipliers 
to the Building was arbitrary and unreasonable. 
Moreover, when the City applied 2 EDU multipliers to the Building beginning in 
2007, its actions were unreasonable because the City went beyond the authority of its own 
ordinance. For the years 2007 through May 2014, the EDU multiplier for an office building 
under the City's ordinance was based on number of employees. An office building with up to 
20 employees was given a multiplier of 1 EDU. The Building had less than 20 employees for 
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more to the ordinance. 
Under its current ordinance, the City adopted a multiplier of 1 EDU for every 4,000 
square feet of office space. Office and office space are not defined in the City's current 
ordinance. Nor does the ordinance describe or define how office space will be measured for 
purposes of determining square footage. There was no factual basis supporting the City's 
decision to assess EDUs on a square footage basis; certainly, there was no evidence showing 
that square footage bore any reasonable relationship to actual benefit conferred. 
Using square footage as the sole factor for purposes of applying EDU multipliers, the 
City's ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable. Furthermore, the application of the City's 
ordinance to the Building was arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The City acknowledged the national standard of 350 gpd in wastewater discharge was 
a basis for the City's equivalent dwelling user. If the City followed that standard, it could not 
under either ordinance assess 2 or more EDU multipliers to the Building. 
Undisputed facts establish the Building had 2,100 square feet of actual office space, 
had less than 20 employees, consumed less than 100 gpd in metered water, and discharged 
wastewater in a flowrate equally 1/3 of the City's accepted standard for 1 EDU. 
It is unequivocally unreasonable for the City to charge MILC a double sewer 
rate when the Building's actual discharge rate is less than the City's standard EDU. 
In its decision on appeal, the district court incorrectly reached the following 
conclusion: 
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Manwaring's complaint to it very 
core. Manwaring's lawsuit, and this subsequent appeal, is not about the 
reasonableness of City Ordinance 9-3-20, which sets the EDU for businesses 
without food preparation facilities at 1 for every 4,000 square feet. Instead, 
Manwaring contests the application of 2 ED Us to its Building, which happens 
to measure 5,000 square feet. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 180). 
The district court erred in reaching that conclusion. Unquestionably, MILC 
challenged the arbitrariness of the City's ordinance basing EDU assessments solely on square 
footage. The district court went on to note that as a matter of law because the Building had 
shared bathroom facilities, it could be assessed 2 EDU multipliers. That determination came 
not from the City's ordinance but from Rex Moffat's testimony. (Clerk's Record, p. 181). 
Moffat's testimony was that he could not remember the exact wording of the 
ordinance and that under the business category of the ordinance it is still a square footage 
determination. (Clerk's Record, pp. 84-85). Nothing in Moffat's testimony supports the 
district court's legal determination that shared facilities somehow trumps the square footage 
requirements of the City's ordinance. The 2014 ordinance nowhere states that shared 
facilities allows an assessment of 2 EDU multipliers. 
Contrary to the district court's opinion, MILC challenged both the City's 2014 
ordinance basing EDU assessments on square footage alone and the City's arbitrary action in 
assessing 2 EDUs against the Building. Also contrary to the district court's opinion, national 
standards applicable to the City establish the reasonable basis for assessing EDUs for offices 
is number of employees and not square footage or shared facilities. 
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upholding the summary judgment 
D. The district court erred as a matter of law in determininP- that the Citv's sewer rates 
applied to the Building were not an unlawful tax where MILC is paying for services it is not 
rece1vmg. 
When sewer fees conform to the statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho Revenue 
Bond Act or are imposed pursuant to a valid police power, the charges are not construed as 
taxes. Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P.2d 515 (1953). "However, if the 
rates, fees and charges are imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes, they are in 
essence disguised taxes and subject to legislative approval and authority." Loomis v. City of 
Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 438, 807 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1991) citing Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 
115 Idaho 502,768 P.2d 765 (1989). 
Where evidence shows the actual cost of providing sewer services to a customer 
connecting to a city's sewer system bears no relationship to the sewer rates charged, the rate 
is an unreasonable tax. North Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City of Hayden, 158 
Idaho 79, 343 P.3d 1086 (2015). 
The district court approved the magistrate's application of the proper standard 
articulated in Loomis. In short, the district court concluded the City's sewer rate was not an 
unlawful tax because it appeared reasonable in providing an equitable distribution of the 
costs and expenses of the entire wastewater system. Additionally, the district court sustained 
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The district court did not address the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in North 
Idaho Building. Nor did the district court recognize there was no evidence in the record that 
the City's assessment of 2 EDUs against the Building was the actual cost of the services 
being rendered to MILC. In fact, all the evidence proved the contrary. Where evidence 
proves that an assessment of 2 EDUs is not the actual cost of the sewer service being 
provided, the fees assessed are an unlawful tax. See North Idaho Building Contractors 
Association v. City of Hayden, 158 Idaho 79,343 P.3d 1086 (2015). 
Prior argument has already shown the City adopted an EDU standard of 350 gpd. 
Prior argument has already shown the City's ordinance in effect from 2007 to May 2014 
based EDU multipliers on numbers of employees. Prior argument has already shown the 
City's 2014 ordinance is arbitrary and random because it is based on square footage without 
any reasonable relationship to services provided. Undisputed facts prove MILC discharges 
wastewater in a flowrate equal to or less than 1/3 of the City's accepted standard EDU of 350 
gpd. Undisputed facts prove the City is not providing services to the Building reasonably 
related to an assessment of 2 EDU multipliers. 
Contrary to the district court's position, MILC does not have the burden of proving 
the City is raising funds exceeding the expenses of its wastewater system. Nor does MILC 
have to prove the City used funds generated through sewer services for other City expenses. 
All MILC is obligated to prove is that as applied to the Building the City's sewer fees are an 
Appellant's Brief - Page 34 
relationship to actual services 
As a matter of law the district court erred. 
E. The district court erred as a matter of law in determining the City did not violate MILC' s 
due process rights when the City failed to give notice of the increase in EDU multipliers it 
was assessing to the Building. 
The district court upheld the magistrate's grant of summary judgment on the issue of 
due process on an alternative theory that MILC has not demonstrated a protected property 
interest. Viewing the City's ordinance as being subject to amendment from time to time by 
resolution, the district court reaches the conclusion that MILC has no protected property 
interest. That conclusion of law in unsupported by facts and law. 
It is beyond cavil that MILC has a protectable interest in its Building and the fees 
charged by the City for services to that Building. 
The City acknowledges property owner's interests in sewer fees because the City 
created an assessment worksheet for the purpose of giving property owners written notice of 
actual sewer fee assessments. According to the City, changes in the assessments, or even 
resolutions, must be done with notice to the property owner. Contrary to the district court's 
analysis, MILC is not claiming an entitlement to a particular EDU assessment. Rather, 
MILC has proven that the City's assessment of 2 EDUs to the Building was done without 
notice to MILC, violates state statute, was an arbitrary act, and constitutes an unlawful tax. 
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from to 2 for the Building. no did the a notice to 
MILC and determine in such public hearing the EDU multipliers assessed to the Building. 
Instead, Moffat testified that the assessment of EDU multipliers was done tr1rough his office 
and notice should have been given. The City admitted no notice was given to MILC that the 
City changed the EDU multiplier for the Building in 2007 or in 2014. 
Gregg Manwaring testified MILC did not receive any notice that beginning in 2007 
the City changed the EDU multipliers assessed to the Building from 1 to 2. There was no 
notice or hearing pertaining to the change in the EDU multiplier any time from 2007 to May 
2014. Nor did MILC receive notice of the new assessment performed in August 2014 again 
assessing 2 EDU multipliers to the Building. 
It is axiomatic that under the Idaho Constitution and United States Constitution MILC 
is entitled to due process regarding governmental taking in the nature of fees charged for 
sewer services beyond 1 EDU. 
Due process is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are 
warranted by the particular situation. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 
82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999). "Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and 
abstract words of the Due Process Clause, but there can be no doubt that, at a minimum, they 
require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." A1ullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,313 (1950). Due process requires "an opportunity ... granted 
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case. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush (1982). 
The City admitted it did not give MILC notice of its assessment to increase the sewer 
rates for the Building by a multiplier of 2 EDU s for the years 2007 through May 2014. The 
City admitted it did not give MILC notice of the August 2014 assessment under the newly 
revised ordinance, which assessment again determined a multiplier of 2 EDUs for the 
Building because of shared facilities. 
The lack of notice was a violation of MILC's due process rights. In short, the City 
without due process to MILC doubled the sewer rates for the Building. Such action is 
unconstitutional. 
The district court erred as a matter of law. 
F. The district court erred as a matter of law in failing to award MILC damages incurred 
through overpayment of sewer fees to the City. 
Gregg Manwaring testified to the amount of damages MILC suffered as a result of the 
City's action in charging excess fees for sewer services to the Building. Of course, the 
district court claims MILC did not show it was entitled to damages. Notably, the City did not 
dispute the amount of daniages claimed or MILC's right to damages in the event it was 
granted judgment. 
Appellant's Brief - Page 37 
Additional damages have been incurred due to the business compulsion of being required to 
pay the excess fees while this action is pending. 
The district court's decision shonlrl he reverser! ::incl rem::inrle.rl to the mf!gistrntP for 
entry of judgment for damages as accrued through the pendency of this action. 
G. The district court erred in concluding the issuance of an injunction was moot. 
The district court declined to review the magistrate's denial of MILC's request for an 
injunction. The district court concluded MILC's arguments for an injunction were moot. 
Upon reversal of the district court's decision and remand to the magistrate division, 
the question of issuance of an injunction must be addressed. 
Standard of Review 
"The standard of review regarding a grant or denial of an injunction is abuse of 
discretion." Afiller v. Bd of Tr., 132 Idaho 244, 245-46, 970 P.2d 512, 513-14 (1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1159, 119 S.Ct. 2050, 144 L.Ed.2d 216 (1999). 
MILC applied to the magistrate for injunctive relief to restrain the City from 
continuing to charge and collect fees for the excess sewer charges based on the assessment of 
2 EDU multipliers to the Building. The magistrate denied MILC's application for injunctive 
relief. 
In denying injunctive relief to MILC, the magistrate was laboring under incorrect 
legal standards and misperception of undisputed facts. The City was assessing 2 EDU 
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wastewater a flowrate less than 1/3 standard. current ordinance 
based on square footage alone was arbitrary. Only because of business compulsion was 
MILC paying the excess sewer rate, thus suffering ongoing i11Jury and harm. The City stated 
it would continue to charge the arbitrary 2 EDU multipliers to the Building, thus exposing 
MILC to permanent damage. 
Issuance of a preliminary injunction would not have caused any injury to the City. 
Issuance of a preliminary injunction would have maintained the parties in status quo pending 
ultimate determination on the merits. 
Reversal will require remand for damages and issuance of a permanent injunction 
preventing the City from assessing future sewer rates against MILC based on 2 or more EDU 
multipliers. In the event the City can establish facts supporting an assessment of 2 EDU 
multipliers to the Building, it can then petition for removal of the injunction. Meanwhile, 
MILC will be protected from injury. 
H. The district court erred in determining the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in 
denying MILC 's motion for reconsideration. 
The district court stated MILC's arguments were moot where it found the City's EDU 
assessment of the Building was not shown to be unreasonable or arbitrarily applied. If on 
appeal the court reverses the district court's decision and remands to the magistrate division, 
Appellant's Brief - Page 39 
magistrate did not abuse its in denying motion reconsideration. 
Standard of Review 
"In considering whether a district court has abused its discretion this Court examines 
three issues: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that issue as discretionary; (2) whether 
the court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision through an exercise of reason." 
Peterson v. Private Wilderness, LLC, 152 Idaho 691,694,273 P.3d 1284, 1287 (2012), citing 
Parkside Sch., Inc. v. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, 145 Idaho 176, 178, 177 P.3d 390, 
392 (2008). 
In denying MILC's motion for reconsideration, the magistrate focused on whether the 
City's rates were reasonable instead of examining the direct issues on whether the assessment 
of 2 EDU multipliers to the Building were reasonable in relation to the actual services 
provided to MILC. Additionally, the magistrate misdirected its analysis to whether there 
could be a more precise method for user rates. The magistrate concluded: 
Could B use a more precise methodology for setting its wastewater 
user rates? Yes. Lance Bates does give a more precise method of setting 
wastewater user rates, but at what cost (meters on every business for inflow 
and outflow, number and type of plumbing fixtures in each business, number 
of employees and customers each reporting cycle, and so on). It appears in 
Idaho, by statute and case law the standard is "reasonable approximation" 
without charging more that is required to make the system self-sufficient 
(enterprise fund concept). B appears to have met this standard in this instance 
in setting its wastewater user rate and applying it to B (sic). 
Order RE: Motion to Reconsider, page 2. 
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method, Bates gave the actual engineering standards for determining EDU rates applicable 
to commercial office buildings; 2) Bates did not offer a method that involved meters on every 
business for inflow and outflow; 3) Rates did not offer a method requiring determination of 
plumbing fixtures in each business, rather, Bates explained that the number and type of 
plumbing fixtures can be considered and are part of the engineering standard he presented in 
the engineering treatise; 4) Bates did not offer a method requiring determination of number 
of employees and customers for each reporting cycle, instead, Bates presented the treatise 
containing the national engineering standard of reliance on number of employees in an office 
building for EDU multipliers; and 5) there was no "so on" factors given by Bates as part of 
any method. The magistrate created its own factual illusions to parade in its analysis. 
By creating facts that do not exist and using them to support its analysis, the 
magistrate did not apply proper legal standards and did not reach its conclusion though an 
exercise of reason. 
The magistrate declared an incorrect legal standard in Idaho. Reasonable 
approximation was not the legal standard applicable to the issues presented. Nor is charging a 
rate that makes the system self-sufficient the standard. The issue was not whether the base 
rate charged for sewer services was reasonable. The issues were whether the City's 
application of 2 EDU multipliers to the Building violated statute or were arbitrary and 
unreasonable. 
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rPr1Pci·tprf here. 
Where the magistrate applies the wrong legal standards, it abused its discretion. 
Where the magistrate did not reach its decision based on an exercise of reason on correct 
standards, it abused its discretion. 
The district court erred in determining the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in 
denying MILC's motion for reconsideration. 
I. MILC is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
In accordance with I.A.R. 40, MILC requests on appeal an award of its costs. 
In accordance with I.AR. 41, MILC requests an award of its attorney fees on appeal. 
Under I.C. § 12-117, "the party seeking fees must be the prevailing party and the losing party 
must have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Rowley v. Ada Cnty. Highway 
Dist., 156 Idaho 275, 282, 322 P.3d 1008, 1015 (2014) (quoting City of Osburn v. Randel, 
152 Idaho 906,910,277 P.3d 353, 357 (2012)). 
"The dual purpose of I.C. § 12-117 is to (1) deter groundless or arbitrary agency 
action; and (2) to provide 'a remedy for persons who have borne an unfair and unjustified 
financial burden attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have made." Fuchs v. 
Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control, 153 Idaho 114,117,279 P.3d 100, 103 (2012) 
(quoting Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah Cnty., 144 Idaho 806, 809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 
(2007)). 
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basis fact or law. V. Ketchum, 1 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 
1091, 1098 (2005). See also Flying "A" Ranch Inc. v. County Commissioners of Fremont 
County, 342 P.3d 649, 656 (2015); University of Utah Hosp. v. Ada County Bd of Com'rs, 
143 Idaho 808, 153 P.3d 1154 (2007). 
Here the City's action in assessing 2 EDUs to the Building from 2007 to May 2014 
was without factual and legal basis, and exceeded the authority conferred by its own 
ordinance. Consequently, the City had no reasonable basis in fact or law to assess 2 EDUs 
against the Building. MILC has been forced to bear an unfair and unjustified financial 
burden. 
The City's action in assessing 2 EDUs to the Building beginning in August 2014 was 
arbitrary where it was based solely on an arbitrary ordinance that has no reasonableness 
relationship between the fees charged to the Building and the benefit of sewer services to the 
Building. 
Accordingly, MILC is entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorney fees on 
appeal. 
Upon reversal, MILC will be entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorney 
fees in the magistrate division. 
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reversed. 
The case should be remanded to the magistrate for determination of total damages 
and entry of judgment for those damages together with entry of a permanent injunction. 
MILC is entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
Dated this~ day of January 2017. 
~/J'hn~ Kipp. ~aring 
Attorney for Appellant 
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